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Abortion controversy
To the Editor:
The statement of Professor
Donald Regan on the advisability
of amending the Constitution to
restrict or prohibit abortion contained in the spring issue of Law
Quadrangle Notes requires a
response. That the subject has
invoked, and will continue to
invoke, serious consideration on
legal, moral, and philosophical
levels is evident. I submit
that the legal aspect demands
deeper consideration than the
Senate Committee received in this
instance.
Professor Regan's statement
avoids the fundamental issuethe reason for considering the
amendment at all.
Regan says, "The first issue
that arises, on my approach as on
a standard approach, is whether
the fetus is to be regarded as a
person. In my view, a general
consideration of our laws does
not compel an answer to this
question either way. I shall therefore concede for purposes of the
following argument that it is permissible to regard the fetus as a
person." (Page 30)
The law cannot ignore the existence of the viable fetus nor can
it be neutral toward it. The fetus
must be afforded full, partial,
or no protection whatsoever
under the law. The controversy
exists precisely because this is so.
At issue is the future of our law
as it will be applied to the fetus,
to the woman and the man
involved, and to society in gen eral. Whichever position is finally
adopted, it would seem essential
that the nature of the fetus be
determined and that such determination govern the law to be
applied. If the nature of the fetus
is determined to be such that
the law regard it as a person, by
Constitutional Amendment or
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otherwise, then the fetus is entitled to the protection afforded a
person under our law, including
the Fourteenth Amendment right
to life. For the purpose of his
argument, Professor Regan
regards the fetus as a person. His
conclusions following from what
he regards as "basic tenets of our
legal culture" are, however,
legally unsupportable.
Regan, maintaining that "the
issue is whether the woman
should be free to reject the fetus's
claim," would dispose of Fourteenth Amendment rights with
the simple and puzzling assertion
that we have other values besides
the preservation of life and the
other values sometimes prevail
over the value of life (Page 31). So
much for the life of the person.
One shall not be deprived of life
without due process-unless, per
Professor Regan, other values
prevail. Hopefully for all of us,
the courts will not discover and
apply the Regan doctrine
generally.
We are offered the proposition
that the act of abortion by physical or chemical means constitutes
no invasion of the fetus's life
from outside but, rather, a rejection of the fetus's claim on the
woman, a mere "refusal to aid."
Surely, it can hardly be seriously
contended that the fetus has not
been invaded from outside when
physical or chemical means are
inserted into the woman to
destroy the fetus. Except in the
case of certain medical emergencies, the outside force acts by
or through the consent of the
woman. If one wishes to engage
in the sophistry of referring to the
destruction of the fetus as a rejection of its claim on the woman,
one may do so, but one does not
thereby resolve the legal and
Constitutional issues.
Regan argues that to legally
protect and preserve the existence
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of the fetus is to invoke class discrimination against, to impose
an improper burden upon, and to
unduly require the giving of aid
by the woman whose condition
she neither invited nor desired.
The Committee was offered purported analogies-the
continuation of the relationship
between prospective mother and
child is compared to compelled
organ donation, to death risking
rescue efforts and to a duty to call
a doctor for an injured person.
To attempt to establish the direction the law should take upon the
subject of abortion by the use of
these grossly dissimilar illustrations is a misleading approach. It
might well be asked, given Professor Regan's approach that the
basic tenets of our legal culture
should not prohibit or restrict
abortion of the person regarded
fetus, why such basic tenets
should prohibit damage to or
destruction of an infant. The
infant's very presence may have
been unwanted. It may place a
serious and unique kind of burden on the mother, a member
of a class of individuals who have
suffered discrimination, who
desires to reject the infant's claim
and who has made no contract
to give it aid. The infant is
afforded the law's full protection
because it has been determined to
possess the nature and properties
of a human person and is, accordingly, legally so regarded. As a
person, it is protected by the
right to life, to due process of
law, even against the burdened
mother.
If the fetus does not possess the
nature and properties of a human
person, our Constitution and
law need not afford it rights
which we so proudly and magnificently assert and diligently
maintain for the human person.
If, however, the fetus does possess such nature and properties,
it would be a tragic error for our
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legal system to fail to protect its
very existence.

Hon. John H. Norton, J.D. '48

Professor Regan responds:
Many of Judge Norton's criticisms would be answered by
an attentive rereading of my testimony. (A fuller statement of my
view is available in the article
on which the testimony was
based, "Rewriting Roe v. Wade",
77 Michigan Law Review
1569-1646 (1979). Two points
deserve comment here.
(1) I suggest in the testimony
that abortion does not involve
"an invasion of the [fetus's] life
from outside". Judge Norton asks
how I can deny that abortion
invades the fetus from outside.
He has altered my claim, substituting "the fetus" for "the fetus's
life." The clear point of the paragraph from which Judge Norton
selects one phrase is this: The
woman is not related to the fetus
in the way the ordinary active
wrongdoer (a murderer, say) is
related to his victim. We can
solve the murder-victim's problem by removing the murderer
from the scene. We cannot solve
the fetus's problem by removing
the woman. That is why it is
appropriate to think of the fetus,
unlike the murder-victim, as
making positive demands.
(2) Judge Norton suggests that
my argument would justify
infanticide. There are many differences between the situation of
a live-born infant and that of a
fetus in utero. One important
difference is that a woman can
extricate herself from the claims
of an infant without bringing
about its death. She can give it
up for adoption. The conflict
between the woman's interests
and the fetus's permits no analogous resolution. Further, the
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woman who has a child and does
not give it up for adoption has
voluntarily assumed duties to the
child (or has done something on
which it is reasonable to predicate a voluntary assumption of
duties) much more clearly than
the woman who has unintentionally become pregnant.

A defense of Leidy
To the Editor:
A grave injustice has been done
Prof. Leidy. I don't know that he
needs anyone to pick up the cudgels for him, or that he would
appreciate me, of all people, picking them up.
I refer to his supposed remark
about working and attending our
law school in the Letters section
of the spring edition.
Much of my life I lived in Ann
Arbor and worked from the 9th
grade on. I knew many of the
professors and they knew me, so
there was no place to hide. By the
time I hit Law School, I was in
highly visible jobs, such as waiting table for a caterer. I saw all
the faculty members regularly.
Of my six closest friends in
Law School, five were working
their way through. We all made
it, although not without travail in
my case. So I regularly saw
Prof. Leidy. Only once did he
mention my jobs, and that was to
remind me that it was a tough
haul doing it that way, but we all
knew that.
If I were asked his attitude
towards we working stiffs, I
would say he was compassionate.
That would tend to be confirmed
by his remark after I received
my diploma-to the effect that
there were times when the faculty
thought I wouldn't make it. That
feeling I had shared with them.
I sort of suspected that his performance was a shell covering a
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considerate heart-in a tough job
of trying to make attorneys out
of a bunch of boys. The record
would seem to indicate how successful he and the other members
of the faculty were.

0. H. Hoard, J.O. '32

Law School burlesque
To The Editor:
I cannot overlook the caustic
remarks about Professor Bates,
Leidy, Aigler, and Grismore in
W.J. Harleton's letter ... I think
I knew these fine men well
enough to argue that Harleton' s
claim that they did not have a
sense of humor is crazy. They
had to have it to put up with the
students of those days. Before
my time, the Phi Delta Phi's
imported the entire chorus of a
burlesque show, together with a
name band, for a wild three day
party, and I understand that
Bates single-handedly saved the
entire fraternity from expulsion
from the University.
Another proof of Dean Bates's
sense of humor was his storytelling. He had been Secretary of
the Western Golf Association
and his story about the Engli sh
golfer who was caught in a folding bed in Chicago was a classic.
He frequently came to the Phi
Delta Phi house for dinner and
nobody wanted to miss his visits. Dean Bates was important in
bringing to the Law School the
national prominence it enjoys
today.
If some of the students thought
these men were too formal, I submit they should now have the
hindsight to appreciate what
these ~evoted men did for many
of us m those trying times when
we were in law school.
1

George E. Diethelm, J.D. '32
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